Credible Commitments: Using Options to Support Partnerships

Marian W. Moszoro
{"title":"Credible Commitments: Using Options to Support Partnerships","authors":"Marian W. Moszoro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1729652","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.","PeriodicalId":395628,"journal":{"name":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729652","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.
可信的承诺:利用各种选择支持伙伴关系
机会主义——要么是政府通过不公平的监管和征用加以阻碍,要么是私人垄断定价、投资和质量控制——是阻碍公私合作伙伴关系成功发展的强大障碍,这种伙伴关系具有大量沉没投资和福利外部性。代理人可以通过交换投资者的退出(看跌)期权和公共代理人对投资者支出的救市(买入)期权来克服这种双面道德风险。退出/救助选择机制通过抵消偏离增加了收益集,从而促进了合作。该机制适用于其他目标部分一致和信息不对称的情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信