{"title":"Credible Commitments: Using Options to Support Partnerships","authors":"Marian W. Moszoro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1729652","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.","PeriodicalId":395628,"journal":{"name":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729652","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.