Wittgenstein on Names

Abstract

I In Naming and Necessity Kripke rejected the Russellian theory of proper names as neither an adequate nor a correct treatment of proper names. Kripke argued (along with many others) that the Russellian view fails to account for the significance of the fact that different descriptions may be (and are) used in place of a name to designate an object. So one person might designate Aristotle as 'the teacher of Alexander the Great', another as 'the most famous student of Plato', another as 'the author of the Metaphysics' and so on. (Even a single speaker might use various descriptions at different times to designate Aristotle.) Clearly, the notion of proper names as disguised or shorthand definite descriptions is faulty, for if the name 'Aristotle' means 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' then the statement 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great' would be a tautology something it surely is not. So, said Kripke, being the teacher of Alexander the Great cannot be part of (the sense of) the name 'Aristotle'.