Monodeep Kar, Arvind Singh, Anand Rajan, V. De, S. Mukhopadhyay
{"title":"What does ultra low power requirements mean for side-channel secure cryptography?","authors":"Monodeep Kar, Arvind Singh, Anand Rajan, V. De, S. Mukhopadhyay","doi":"10.1109/ICCD.2016.7753359","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The design of low power and side-channel-attack resistant encryption engine is a key challenge to enhance security of resource-constrained platforms. This paper present case studies to show that the low-power requirement is a challenge as well as an opportunity for improving side-channel resistance. On one hand, low-power encryption architecture can be more vulnerable to power-attack; and the countermeasures comes with significant overhead. However, on the other hand, low-power circuit techniques such as integrated voltage regulation or adaptive clocking can also be exploited to improve power-attack resistance. The analysis shows the need for future research on low-power and side-channel secure cryptography.","PeriodicalId":297899,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 34th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 IEEE 34th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCD.2016.7753359","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
The design of low power and side-channel-attack resistant encryption engine is a key challenge to enhance security of resource-constrained platforms. This paper present case studies to show that the low-power requirement is a challenge as well as an opportunity for improving side-channel resistance. On one hand, low-power encryption architecture can be more vulnerable to power-attack; and the countermeasures comes with significant overhead. However, on the other hand, low-power circuit techniques such as integrated voltage regulation or adaptive clocking can also be exploited to improve power-attack resistance. The analysis shows the need for future research on low-power and side-channel secure cryptography.