Economic and Environmental Benefits from International Cooperation on Climate Policies

G. Schwerhoff, Jean Château, Florence Jaumotte
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引用次数: 22

Abstract

analyzes and compares various international mechanisms proposed to enhance global climate action, discussing their emission, economic, burden-sharing, and competitiveness impacts. It assesses five main policy scenarios going up to 2030 in line with the horizon of NDCs. The first policy scenario is an international carbon price floor similar to that proposed by Black and others (2021), in which high-, middle- and low-income countries introduce carbon price floors of $75, $50, and $25, respectively, and countries implement the maximum of their carbon price floor and the carbon price implicit in their Nationally Determined Contribution. The use of price minima allows the arrangement to complement the Paris Agreement—countries can still set higher prices than the floor price if this is needed to help meet their Paris pledge. One difference between this scenario and that in Black and others (2021) is that the carbon price floors are applied worldwide and not just to a subset of large emitters, in the spirit of global minimum carbon prices and to minimize competitiveness concerns. The second scenario calculates the uniform global carbon price which delivers cumulative emissions reductions similar to those of the international carbon price floor arrangement (the carbon price in 2030 is about $56, close to the midpoint of the carbon price floors) and assumes all countries implement this price. The third and fourth scenarios consider the case of fragmented action, in which only high-income countries implement ambitious climate policies, and examine the impacts both without and with border carbon adjustment of various designs. Finally, in a last scenario that assumes that MICs and LICs not to implement an economy-wide international carbon price floor, the paper explores whether they could nevertheless be amenable to an international carbon price floor arrangement limited to energy-intensive and trade-exposed in order to avoid the imposition of border carbon
气候政策国际合作带来的经济和环境效益
分析和比较旨在加强全球气候行动的各种国际机制,讨论它们对排放、经济、负担分担和竞争力的影响。它根据国家自主贡献的范围,评估了到2030年的五种主要政策情景。第一种政策情景是类似于Black等人(2021年)提出的国际碳价下限,其中高、中、低收入国家分别引入75美元、50美元和25美元的碳价下限,各国实施其碳价下限的最大值和国家自主贡献中隐含的碳价。最低价格的使用使该安排能够补充《巴黎协定》——如果需要帮助实现其巴黎承诺,各国仍然可以设定高于底价的价格。这一情景与Black和其他情景(2021年)的一个不同之处在于,碳价格下限是在全球范围内适用的,而不仅仅是针对大型排放国的子集,本着全球最低碳价格的精神,并最大限度地减少对竞争力的担忧。第二种情景计算统一的全球碳价,其累计减排量与国际碳价下限安排(2030年碳价约为56美元,接近碳价下限的中点)相似,并假设所有国家都实施这一价格。第三和第四种情景考虑了分散行动的情况,即只有高收入国家实施雄心勃勃的气候政策,并研究了在没有和有各种设计的边界碳调整的情况下的影响。最后,在假设中等收入国家和低收入国家不实施全经济范围的国际碳价格下限的最后一种情景中,本文探讨了它们是否可以接受一项仅限于能源密集型和贸易暴露型的国际碳价格下限安排,以避免征收边境碳
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