{"title":"Fair Resource Bargaining Solutions for Cooperative Multi-Operator Networks","authors":"Siew-Lee Hew, L. White","doi":"10.1109/IZS.2006.1649078","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The high cost associated with the rollout of 3G services encourages operators to share network infrastructure. Network sharing poses a new challenge in devising fair, efficient and Pareto-optimal resource allocation strategies to distribute system resources among users of different operators in the network. Cooperative game theory provides a framework for formulating such strategies. In this paper, we propose a model for cooperative resource allocation game in shared networks and derive a set of bargaining solutions based on the concept of preference functions that depends on the weight that players place on their own gain and the losses of others. We then extend our analysis to nonlinear utility functions","PeriodicalId":405389,"journal":{"name":"2006 International Zurich Seminar on Communications","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2006 International Zurich Seminar on Communications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IZS.2006.1649078","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
The high cost associated with the rollout of 3G services encourages operators to share network infrastructure. Network sharing poses a new challenge in devising fair, efficient and Pareto-optimal resource allocation strategies to distribute system resources among users of different operators in the network. Cooperative game theory provides a framework for formulating such strategies. In this paper, we propose a model for cooperative resource allocation game in shared networks and derive a set of bargaining solutions based on the concept of preference functions that depends on the weight that players place on their own gain and the losses of others. We then extend our analysis to nonlinear utility functions