The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme†

IF 2.4 3区管理学 Q2 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & LABOR

Industrial Relations Pub Date : 2019-03-11 DOI:10.1111/irel.12230

Eva Van Belle, Ralf Caers, Marijke De Couck, Valentina Di Stasio, Stijn Baert

引用次数: 11

Abstract

We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor-market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job-vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.

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根据空缺转介计划申请职位的信号

我们研究了与参与积极劳动力市场计划相关的信号效应。为此，我们进行了一项实验，在实验中，人力资源专业人员对通过职位空缺推荐系统或直接申请的虚拟求职者做出招聘决定。我们提供了第一个因果证据，证明推荐对被雇用的可能性有实质性的不利影响。此外，我们发现雇主认为被推荐的候选人比其他候选人更缺乏积极性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Industrial Relations INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & LABOR-

CiteScore

4.40

自引率

8.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Corporate restructuring and downsizing, the changing employment relationship in union and nonunion settings, high performance work systems, the demographics of the workplace, and the impact of globalization on national labor markets - these are just some of the major issues covered in Industrial Relations. The journal offers an invaluable international perspective on economic, sociological, psychological, political, historical, and legal developments in labor and employment. It is the only journal in its field with this multidisciplinary focus on the implications of change for business, government and workers.