{"title":"Are Hard Cases Vague Cases?","authors":"R. Chang","doi":"10.4324/9781003148012-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a ‘hard case’ of comparison between two items, it seems that one is not better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. A common explanation of such cases is that appearances are deceiving: it is indeterminate – vague – which relation holds. I offer two arguments against thinking that hard cases are cases of vagueness. First, arbitrary stipulation in cases of vagueness resolves the vagueness but arbitrary stipulation in hard cases leaves ‘resolutional remainder’. Second, vagueness prohibits ‘normative leakage’, that is, making a series of choices based on comparisons in which you end up with something worse than what you could have had, while hard cases rationally permit such leakage. Indeed, it could be said part of the point of hard cases is to allow rational agents to change normative direction despite the normative costs of doing so. I end by describing how ‘parity’, a fourth, sui generis way items can be compared, solves both of the problems faced by vagueness. Hard cases, I suggest, are cases in which items are on a par. In a hard case of comparison between two items, it seems that that neither is better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. If you are comparing careers in investment banking and interior design, you might judge that the banking career is better in some relevant respects, the design career better in other relevant respects, and yet neither is at least as good as the other overall. Or if you are comparing the evidence for believing that there is a God and the evidence for disbelieving (or withholding judgment), you might judge that the case for belief is better in some respects, worse in others, and yet the evidence for each attitude is not at least as warrant-providing or justifying as the other. As these cases illustrate, hard cases occur in both the practical and theoretical domains. In their simplest form, they are normative comparisons of items, A and B, with respect to a 1 Thanks to the editors of this volume and to the audience at the UK ALPP, especially Matt Kramer, Rae Langton, and Re’em Segev, for comments that led me to make what I hope are useful clarifications, and to Kit Fine for discussion about the varieties of vagueness that saved me from many infelicities and helped me to simplify my arguments.","PeriodicalId":405623,"journal":{"name":"Value Incommensurability","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Value Incommensurability","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003148012-4","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
In a ‘hard case’ of comparison between two items, it seems that one is not better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. A common explanation of such cases is that appearances are deceiving: it is indeterminate – vague – which relation holds. I offer two arguments against thinking that hard cases are cases of vagueness. First, arbitrary stipulation in cases of vagueness resolves the vagueness but arbitrary stipulation in hard cases leaves ‘resolutional remainder’. Second, vagueness prohibits ‘normative leakage’, that is, making a series of choices based on comparisons in which you end up with something worse than what you could have had, while hard cases rationally permit such leakage. Indeed, it could be said part of the point of hard cases is to allow rational agents to change normative direction despite the normative costs of doing so. I end by describing how ‘parity’, a fourth, sui generis way items can be compared, solves both of the problems faced by vagueness. Hard cases, I suggest, are cases in which items are on a par. In a hard case of comparison between two items, it seems that that neither is better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. If you are comparing careers in investment banking and interior design, you might judge that the banking career is better in some relevant respects, the design career better in other relevant respects, and yet neither is at least as good as the other overall. Or if you are comparing the evidence for believing that there is a God and the evidence for disbelieving (or withholding judgment), you might judge that the case for belief is better in some respects, worse in others, and yet the evidence for each attitude is not at least as warrant-providing or justifying as the other. As these cases illustrate, hard cases occur in both the practical and theoretical domains. In their simplest form, they are normative comparisons of items, A and B, with respect to a 1 Thanks to the editors of this volume and to the audience at the UK ALPP, especially Matt Kramer, Rae Langton, and Re’em Segev, for comments that led me to make what I hope are useful clarifications, and to Kit Fine for discussion about the varieties of vagueness that saved me from many infelicities and helped me to simplify my arguments.