{"title":"The Selection Principle in Games","authors":"Susheng Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3754141","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We intend to solve the uniqueness problem of equilibria for all games. We introduce a new rationality criterion for games, which rules out many equilibria. Our selection principle is based on the argument that since the players know the set of potential equilibria of a game, they will actively select an equilibrium in their own interest. We show the existence and uniqueness of the selectable equilibrium. We also propose a selection mechanism by which all selectable equilibria can be identified.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3754141","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We intend to solve the uniqueness problem of equilibria for all games. We introduce a new rationality criterion for games, which rules out many equilibria. Our selection principle is based on the argument that since the players know the set of potential equilibria of a game, they will actively select an equilibrium in their own interest. We show the existence and uniqueness of the selectable equilibrium. We also propose a selection mechanism by which all selectable equilibria can be identified.