Research on Executive Incentive and Financial Risk

Jing Ma
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Abstract

This paper selects the data of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017 as a research sample, and explores the relationship between executive incentives, equity concentration and financial risk through empirical analysis. The study found that the relationship between compensation incentives and financial risks is a non-linear positive U-shape, and equity incentives and financial risks are linearly negatively correlated. The research contribution is mainly based on the industry-wide research sample to deeply explore the true impact of executive incentives on financial risks. The conclusion is more universal; it provides reference for enterprises to reduce financial risks and optimize capital structure from the perspective of internal governance.
高管激励与财务风险研究
本文选取2013 - 2017年a股上市公司数据作为研究样本,通过实证分析探讨高管激励、股权集中度与财务风险之间的关系。研究发现,薪酬激励与财务风险呈非线性正u型关系,股权激励与财务风险呈线性负相关。研究贡献主要基于全行业的研究样本,深入探讨高管激励对财务风险的真实影响。结论更具普适性;为企业从内部治理角度降低财务风险、优化资本结构提供参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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