TCS Security Analysis in Intel SGX Enclave MultiThreading

2022 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA) Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1109/NaNA56854.2022.00054

Tong Zhang, Xiangjie Cui, Yichuan Wang, Yanning Du, W. Gao

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引用次数: 2

Abstract

With the rapid development of Internet Technology in recent years, the demand for security support for complex applications is becoming stronger and stronger. Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) is created as an extension of Intel Systems to enhance software security. Intel SGX allows application developers to create so-called enclave. Sensitive application code and data are encapsulated in Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) by enclave. TEE is completely isolated from other applications, operating systems, and administrative programs. Enclave is the core structure of Intel SGX Technology. Enclave supports multi-threading. Thread Control Structure (TCS) stores special information for restoring enclave threads when entering or exiting enclave. Each execution thread in enclave is associated with a TCS. This paper analyzes and verifies the possible security risks of enclave under concurrent conditions. It is found that in the case of multithread concurrency, a single enclave cannot resist flooding attacks, and related threads also throw TCS exception codes.

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Intel SGX Enclave多线程中的TCS安全性分析

近年来，随着互联网技术的飞速发展，对复杂应用的安全支持需求越来越强。英特尔软件防护扩展(英特尔SGX)创建作为英特尔系统的扩展，以增强软件安全性。英特尔SGX允许应用程序开发人员创建所谓的飞地。敏感的应用程序代码和数据通过enclave封装在可信执行环境(TEE)中。TEE与其他应用程序、操作系统和管理程序完全隔离。Enclave是英特尔SGX技术的核心结构。Enclave支持多线程。线程控制结构(TCS)存储在进入或退出enclave时用于恢复enclave线程的特殊信息。enclave中的每个执行线程都与一个TCS相关联。分析并验证了并行条件下飞地可能存在的安全风险。研究发现，在多线程并发的情况下，单个enclave无法抵抗泛洪攻击，相关线程还会抛出TCS异常码。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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2022 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA)

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