The Sec Rule 506’s Bad Actor Rule: A Condition or an Invalidator of Rule 506 Exemption Status?

J. McMurdo
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Abstract

Federal securities regulation in the United States has one principle goal: to ensure that investors are able to make informed decisions regarding potential investments. To achieve this, federal regulations oblige firms to be forthright with shareholders and potential investors through disclosing material facts, projects, performance metrics, and the like. However, both the states and the federal government regulate securities and, in some cases, there is a clear dividing line between what falls under federal jurisdiction and what is left to the states. In other cases, determining this line is far from clear, resulting in a murky and complex overlap of federal and state regulations. For example, a state could aim to protect state investors by bringing a fraud action against an issuer on the offering’s merits, yet that same offering would be federally compliant and unobjectionable. Because state and federal regulations may have different objectives, investor protection versus disclosure respectively, the tension between them can raise federalism concerns when an offering abides federal regulations yet is deficient under state laws with concurrent jurisdiction. To simplify overlapping state and federal securities regulations, in 1996 Congress passed the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (“NSMIA”) to preempt states from regulating “covered” securities, leaving covered securities solely under substantive federal regulation. While various types of securities are covered, the Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)’s Rule 506 of Regulation D (“Rule 506”) is a prevalent regulation for offerings to qualify as a covered security. Rule 506 covers private offerings that are only available to sophisticated buyers and/or limited in its solicitation methods. Rule 506 provides a “safe harbor” that exempts the private offering from both federal and state registration if its prescribed conditions are met. In response to the economic havoc wrought by the 2008 Great Recession, the SEC introduced several major changes to Rule 506, including the addition of a rule that disqualifies “bad actors” convicted of fraud-related crimes (“Bad Actor Rule”) from relying on Rule 506 for an exempted status. Recent judicial decisions have required an issuer to prove that it is in substantive compliance with Rule 506’s conditions before the offering is actually exempt from state laws. However, if an issuer must prove compliance before being exempted from state securities law, may state securities regulators rebut an issuer’s claimed Rule 506 exemption with evidence that the issuer is non-compliant with the Bad Actor Rule? In other words, may state regulators who have evidence that an issuer has violated the Bad Actor Rule use that evidence to disqualify that issuer from relying on Rule 506 because a condition of Rule 506 is that the issuer must be a “good actor,” in a manner of speaking? Setting aside the merits of this argument for a moment, this Article applies standard statutory interpretation maxims to argue that the text of Rule 506 and the Bad Actor Rule do not support the argument that the Bad Actor Rule is a condition under Rule 506. However, this Article goes on to argue that, as a matter of policy, states ought to have authority to challenge an issuer’s claimed good character. Therefore, the Article will make several appropriate recommendations.
美国证券交易委员会506规则的不良行为者规则:506规则豁免状态的条件或无效因素?
美国的联邦证券监管有一个主要目标:确保投资者能够对潜在的投资做出明智的决定。为了实现这一目标,联邦法规要求公司通过披露重要事实、项目、绩效指标等,对股东和潜在投资者坦诚相待。然而,州政府和联邦政府都对证券进行监管,在某些情况下,联邦政府管辖的证券和州政府管辖的证券之间存在明显的分界线。在其他情况下,确定这条界线远不明确,导致联邦和州法规的重叠模糊而复杂。例如,一个州可以针对发行的优点对发行人提起欺诈诉讼,以保护该州的投资者,但同样的发行将符合联邦政府的规定,并且不会受到反对。由于州和联邦法规可能有不同的目标,分别是投资者保护和信息披露,当发行遵守联邦法规而不符合具有并行管辖权的州法律时,它们之间的紧张关系可能会引起联邦制问题。为了简化重叠的州和联邦证券法规,1996年国会通过了《国家证券市场改进法案》(“NSMIA”),以防止各州监管“担保”证券,将担保证券完全置于实质性的联邦监管之下。虽然涵盖了各种类型的证券,但美国证券交易委员会(“SEC”)第D条第506条(“第506条”)是一项普遍的规定,规定了产品是否有资格成为涵盖证券。规则506涵盖了只有经验丰富的买家和/或其招揽方式有限的私募发行。规则506提供了一个“安全港”,如果满足规定的条件,则豁免私人发行从联邦和州注册。为了应对2008年经济大衰退造成的经济破坏,美国证券交易委员会对506规则进行了几项重大修改,包括增加了一项规则,即被判犯有欺诈相关罪行的“不良行为者”(“不良行为者规则”)不能依靠506规则获得豁免地位。最近的司法判决要求发行人在发行实际上不受州法律约束之前,必须证明其在实质上符合第506条规定的条件。然而,如果发行人必须证明合规才能被豁免于国家证券法,国家证券监管机构是否可以用证据证明发行人不符合不良行为者规则来反驳发行人声称的506规则豁免?换句话说,有证据表明发行人违反了不良行为者规则的州监管机构是否可以使用该证据取消发行人依赖规则506的资格,因为规则506的一个条件是发行人必须是一个“好演员”,从某种程度上说?撇开这一论点的优点不谈,本文运用标准的法律解释原则来论证506规则和不良行为者规则的文本不支持“不良行为者规则”是506规则下的一个条件的论点。然而,本文继续认为,作为一项政策问题,国家应该有权质疑发行人所声称的良好品格。因此,本文将提出几点适当的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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