Koncentracja własności i kontroli a wyniki spółek notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie

J. Marcinkiewicz, M. Kuźma
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Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of the research is to investigate the links between concentration of ownership and control of analysed companies and the value of their financial and market performance, as well as to test whether this performance depends on the presence of owners of large, but non -controlling blocks of votes among shareholders. Research method – The article presents an analysis of data contained in financial statements and Management Board’s reports. Pearson’s correlation coefficient, one -way ANOVA test and Kruskal -Wallis test were also used to investigate the links between concentration of ownership and control of analysed companies and the value of their financial and market performance.Results – The conducted studies showed theconcomitance of concentration of owner-ship and control in hands of shareholders holding over 5% of votes at the general meeting and the financial performance in the analysed entities.The research also showed that the relation between the market value of shares and their book value in companies in which shares of two largest shareholders were the same or comparable was higher than in entities in which a difference between these shares was observed. Moreover, ownership and control structure in such entities allowed them for a better use of resources.Originality / value / implications / recommendations – The article emphasises not only the role of ownership and control concentration as regards the value of financial and market performance of companies, but also presents the desired scope of concentration in the hands of the individual shareholders. It draws attention to the role of large, but non -controlling shareholders in corporate governance, especially in the mitigation of the horizontal agency conflict.
目的-该研究的目的是调查被分析公司的所有权和控制权集中与其财务和市场表现的价值之间的联系,以及测试这种表现是否取决于股东中大型但非控制性投票的所有者的存在。研究方法-本文对财务报表和管理委员会报告中的数据进行了分析。Pearson相关系数、单向方差分析检验和Kruskal -Wallis检验也被用于调查被分析公司的所有权集中度和控制权与其财务和市场绩效价值之间的联系。结果-所进行的研究表明,在股东大会上持有超过5%投票权的股东手中的所有权和控制权的集中与所分析实体的财务业绩密切相关。研究还表明,在两个最大股东的股份相同或可比较的公司中,股票的市场价值与账面价值之间的关系高于观察到这些股份之间存在差异的实体。此外,这些实体的所有权和控制结构使它们能够更好地利用资源。原创性/价值/含义/建议-本文不仅强调了所有权和控制权集中在公司财务和市场表现价值方面的作用,而且还提出了个人股东手中的期望集中范围。它使人们注意到大股东,但非控股股东在公司治理中的作用,特别是在缓解横向代理冲突方面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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