{"title":"The German Army on the Western Front","authors":"Michael A. Hunzeker","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter highlights the German Army's experience on the Western Front. It shows that the German Army learned more effectively as it shifted toward moderately decentralized command practices, developed coherent and independent assessment mechanisms, and exerted centralized control over training. The Germans were the first to reach this ideal setup and were also the first to adopt (most of) the elements of a superior combined-arms doctrine. The chapter also illustrates the way organizational structure influences learning. It argues that the German Army was structured to learn. Its often-cited command practices were part of the story, but its assessment mechanisms and highly centralized training systems were also important. The chapter reveals that the German Army was not more creative or original than its competitors. It was, however, better at turning good concepts into practical doctrine. Ultimately, the chapter examines the importance of tactical performance in the military effectiveness equation, and how the German Army learned faster than its adversaries.","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Dying to Learn","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter highlights the German Army's experience on the Western Front. It shows that the German Army learned more effectively as it shifted toward moderately decentralized command practices, developed coherent and independent assessment mechanisms, and exerted centralized control over training. The Germans were the first to reach this ideal setup and were also the first to adopt (most of) the elements of a superior combined-arms doctrine. The chapter also illustrates the way organizational structure influences learning. It argues that the German Army was structured to learn. Its often-cited command practices were part of the story, but its assessment mechanisms and highly centralized training systems were also important. The chapter reveals that the German Army was not more creative or original than its competitors. It was, however, better at turning good concepts into practical doctrine. Ultimately, the chapter examines the importance of tactical performance in the military effectiveness equation, and how the German Army learned faster than its adversaries.